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Abstract
Visual selective attention (VSA) is the cognitive function that regulates ongoing processing of retinal input in order for
selected representations to gain privileged access to perceptual awareness and guide behavior, facilitating analysis of
currently relevant information while suppressing the less relevant input. Recent findings indicate that the deployment of
VSA is shaped according to past outcomes. Targets whose selection has led to rewarding outcomes become relatively easier
to select in the future, and distracters that have been ignored with higher gains are more easily discarded. Although
outcomes (monetary rewards) were completely predetermined in our prior studies, participants were told that higher
rewards would follow more efficient responses. In a new experiment we have eliminated the illusory link between
performance and outcomes by informing subjects that rewards were randomly assigned. This trivial yet crucial manipulation
led to strikingly different results. Items that were associated more frequently with higher gains became more difficult to
ignore, regardless of the role (target or distracter) they played when differential rewards were delivered. Therefore, VSA is
shaped by two distinct reward-related learning mechanisms: one requiring active monitoring of performance and outcome,
and a second one detecting the sheer association between objects in the environment (whether attended or ignored) and
the more-or-less rewarding events that accompany them.
Citation: Della Libera C, Perlato A, Chelazzi L (2011) Dissociable Effects of Reward on Attentional Learning: From Passive Associations to Active Monitoring. PLoS
ONE 6(4): e19460. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019460
Editor: Michael H. Herzog, Ecole Polytechnique Federale de Lausanne, Switzerland
Received December 24, 2010; Accepted March 30, 2011; Published April 29, 2011
Copyright:  2011 Della Libera et al. This is an open-access article distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons Attribution License, which permits
unrestricted use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original author and source are credited.
Funding: The authors acknowledge generous support from the Italian Government (MIUR) and from Fondazione Cariverona, Verona, Italy. The funders had no
role in study design, data collection and analysis, decision to publish, or preparation of the manuscript.
Competing Interests: The authors have declared that no competing interests exist.
* E-mail: chiara.dellalibera@univr.it
Introduction
It is well established that the amount of information that can be
fully processed at any given moment is limited. Considering for
instance the richness of particulars offered by a typical visual scene
in front of us, it is easy to verify that we cannot be aware of all its
details at all times. Concurrently present stimuli compete with
each other to gain access to limited processing resources, and
visual selective attention (VSA) is the cognitive process responsible
for supervising and resolving this competition. Hence, only a
limited amount of the total incoming information – deemed as
relevant – has a role in behavioral guidance. VSA resolves stimulus
competition by means of a twofold mechanism. On the one hand it
enhances the perceptual saliency of objects which are relevant for
the current behavioral goals; on the other it suppresses the saliency
of the less relevant, and possibly distracting items, whose
processing may in fact harm the execution of the intended
behavior [1–4].
In recent years it has become evident that VSA does not operate
in a rigid fashion, but can instead be adjusted to the given
situation, maximizing the efficiency of behavior. A vast literature
has shown that attentional processes are subject to learning,
becoming more efficient in familiar environments, and for
frequently encountered stimuli, suggesting a strong interplay
between VSA and memory mechanisms (e.g., [5–9]). In visual
search tasks – where subjects must report the presence of a given
target within an array of distracting items – such learning effects
have been observed both in the form of speeded detection of more
frequent target stimuli and powerful suppression of distracters, in
all cases leading to more efficient processing of the practiced
stimulus arrays [10–25]. Recordings of single unit activity from the
inferotemporal cortex of behaving macaques suggest that the
enhanced behavioral relevance of frequently attended stimuli
derives from significant changes in their representation at the
neural level: following extensive training, neuronal responses are
increased for items repeatedly shown as targets, while they are
reduced for those consistently displayed as distracters [26].
The fact that VSA mechanisms are shaped and refined through
learning may be crucial for exerting the most efficient guidance of
human behavior. In a recent set of studies we have highlighted
that the attentional priority of visual stimuli not only depends on
the frequency with which they have been encountered in the past,
but more interestingly on the consequences that followed processing
of such stimuli [27,28]. Using a typical VSA task – where subjects
were asked to respond to a target while ignoring a distracter – each
correct response received a monetary reward, that could have a
low or a high value (i.e., 1 or 10 eurocents, respectively). While all
stimuli were used the same number of times as targets or
distracters, the probability of receiving a high or low reward in
return for a correct behavioral response was biased, depending on
which item had been shown as target or distracter in the stimulus
array during the rewarded trial (Figure 1). While rewards were
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rate), our participants were deceitfully told instead that reward
amounts did depend on their performance, so that of all correct
responses the more efficient would gain high rewards, and the
poor ones low rewards. Following this manipulation some striking
effects emerged, so that, for instance, targets whose selection had
been more successful (i.e., more frequently followed by high
reward) became favorite targets of future selections, and
conversely, distracters whose inhibition had been more successful
became easier to filter out when displayed as distracters on future
occasions [28] (e.g., see Figure 2a).
The relationship between attentional performance and reward
has been further explored in other recent studies [29–34], which
confirmed and extended the evidence for robust attentional biases
determined by controlled reward delivery. In visual search, highly
rewarded targets led to faster and more accurate performance and
stronger inter-trial priming effects [29–33]. Moreover, stimuli
more frequently associated with high rewards became resilient to
the attentional blink phenomenon [34].
Other studies, however, have demonstrated that the biased
delivery of rewards can affect processing of any visual stimulus that
was displayed close in time to the reward signal, even in the
absence of conscious processing of reward-related cues [35], and
even with minimal or null attentional requirements of the given
task [36,37]. As a consequence, stimuli associated with rewarding
events became favorite objects [35], were more easily discrimi-
nated [36,37], and were more vigorously represented in visual
cortical processing areas [36].
Interestingly, while all these studies addressed the effects of
biased stimulus-reward associations on performance, the type of
instructions given to the participants relatively to the nature
of rewards has received less consideration, as if it were irrelevant
for the effects to emerge. In some cases subjects were fully
debriefed that some stimuli would yield higher rewards in turn for
a correct behavioral response [32,34–36], while in others the
relationship between stimuli and outcome probability was
concealed, and subjects were deceitfully encouraged to maximize
the earned rewards as if the earned amount could be determined
by their performance [8,27–31]. Finally, in some cases rewards
were delivered while subjects were engaged in a passive viewing
task, with no behavioral or attentional requirements [36–37].
Given the latter evidence, one might suspect that any effect of
reward on perceptual or attentional processing might rely on a
passive association between the experimental stimuli and the
more-or-less rewarding events that accompany them. Thus,
irrespectively of any link between one’s own performance and
the high or low rewards received afterwards, similar perceptual
and/or attentional adjustments should emerge following sufficient
exposure to a biased reward schedule.
Here we aim to directly explore the origin and nature of the
reward-related effects found in our previous work [28]. For the
Figure 1. Training task and reward schedule. a) Subjects
performed a same/different judgment between one of two overlapping
shapes on the left (designated by the color of a central cue displayed
prior to each stimulus display) and a single shape presented on the
right. During training each correct response was followed by a reward
signal indicating a high or low monetary win. b) Arrangement of
stimulus shapes into biased reward categories for one exemplar
subject.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019460.g001
Figure 2. Behavioral results. a) Results obtained in our previous
research, showing that the effect of reward bias depended on the
attentional role of each stimulus during biased reward delivery ([28]
Exp. 1). b) Results obtained in the present Experiment, showing a
generalized effect of reward bias, unaffected by the associated
attentional roles. Note that the y-axes scales in a) and b) slightly differ.
In all plots error bars denote SEM.
doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0019460.g002
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iment 1 of our previous study [28], but this time we informed
subjects that rewards were random, lottery-like wins, and that these
random gains would sum up to constitute their compensation for
participating to the experiment. Two contrasting predictions can
be made. On the one hand, one might expect to replicate the exact
same pattern of results that we obtained in our original study,
regardless of the different instructions given to the participants. On
the other hand, one might expect that the effects we obtained
previously would weaken or even vanish once deception of
participants is removed, indicating that the original results
depended crucially on active monitoring of performance and
outcome by our subjects. To our surprise, neither prediction was
confirmed, as reported below.
Materials and Methods
Participants, Stimuli and Apparatus
Sixteen naı ¨ve participants took part in the study (8 males, mean
age 23). The stimuli were 16 outlined nonsense shapes (2u62u), as
previously used [27,28]. Stimulus displays were presented on a 17-
inch CRT monitor in a quiet and dimly lit room, at a viewing
distance of 90 cm. All participants read and signed an informed
consent form prior to participating to the experiments. Through-
out the research project leading to this publication, the rights of
the experimental subjects were protected and the applicable
guidelines concerning the use of human subjects for the purposes
of research were followed. The study was approved by the ethics
committee of the Department of Neurological, Neuropsycholog-
ical, Morphological and Movement Sciences of the University of
Verona.
Task and Reward Schedules
Task and reward assignments replicated exactly those used by
Della Libera and Chelazzi [28], Exp. 1 (Figure 1). Subjects
participated in four experimental sessions, each lasting about one
hour and comprising 960 trials. The first three sessions were
regarded as training, and took place on consecutive days. The
fourth and last session was regarded as a test, and took place 5 days
after the last training session. Throughout all experimental sessions
(both training and test), subjects performed in a task where
nonsense figure stimuli were to be conveniently selected and
ignored. On each trial, two overlapping shapes, one in red and one
in green, appeared at 3u of eccentricity on the left of fixation, while
a single black shape was displayed at the same eccentricity on the
right. Subjects were to make a same/different judgment between
one of the shapes on the left and the black shape on the right, by
pressing one of two keys with the index or middle finger of the
right hand. Each trial started with a green or red colored square
(0.5u60.5u) displayed centrally for 400 ms, and signaling which of
the two shapes on the left was relevant during the trial. Six
hundred ms after cue offset, the stimulus display was presented for
3 s or until the subject’s response. Only during the training
sessions, correct responses were followed by reward, which could
be high (J0.10) or low (J0.01), and the amount was shown on the
monitor for 600 ms. No reward was instead delivered during the
test session. In all cases errors were followed by a high pitch tone
for 800 ms, and the new trial started after a 1 s inter-trial interval.
Stimulus displays were designed so that each of the 16 shapes
appeared as target, distracter, or comparison item the same
number of times. Target and comparison item were identical in
50% of cases, requiring a ‘‘same’’ response. In the remaining trials,
which required a ‘‘different’’ response, the comparison item
differed from both target and distracter.
The only difference between this experiment and Exp. 1 in
our prior study [28] consisted in the instructions given to
subjects prior to their participation in the training sessions. Here
participants were informed that reward values did not depend
on performance level, provided that their response was correct,
and could be regarded as random, lottery-like wins awarded to
each correct response. The reward value delivered on each trial
was in fact predetermined and balanced across all experimental
conditions, being high or low with the same overall probability
(50%). However, the schedule of reward assignment was
crucially biased so that at the end of training the sixteen total
stimuli could be divided into different categories depending on
the proportion of high versus low rewards received in trials
where they served as target or distracter (see Figure 1b). Two
shapes were followed by a high reward in 80% of trials where
they had been a target (T+); two other shapes were followed by
a high reward in 80% of trials where they had been a distracter
(D+). Two shapes were followed by a high reward in 20% of
trials where they had been a target (T2); and finally two other
shapes were followed by a high reward in 20% of trials where
they had been a distracter (D2). Importantly, when these eight
shapes were displayed in the role that was not associated with a
bias in the reward schedule (e.g., when a T+ item was presented
as a distracter), they led to a high or low reward with equal
probability. The remaining eight shapes were used as neutral
fillers, and they led to high or low reward in 50% of cases
both when displayed as target and distracter. In order to avoid
any possible confound given by the fixed association of indi-
vidual shapes to each of the experimental categories, the same
sixteen shapes were sorted differently across categories for each
participant.
Results
We focused our analysis on performance during the test session,
including reaction times (RT) of correct responses and error rates
(ER). Since none of the differences in ER across conditions
reached statistical significance, they are not reported. Average ER
was 3%.
For RT analysis, trials were first grouped according to the type
of shape used as the target in the current test trial, and data were
submitted to a ANOVA with reward bias (80% high/20% low or
20% high/80% low) and item history (bias applied when target or
distracter during training) as main factors. Similarly to what we
had found in our previous work [28], neither of the main effects
nor the interaction between the two reached statistical significance
(reward bias: F(1,15)=0.033, n.s.; item history: F(1,15)=0.059,
n.s.; reward bias6item history: F(1,15)=0.094, n.s.) (Figure 2b, left
panel).
A second ANOVA was then conducted according to the type of
shape used as the distracter in the trial. The ANOVA with reward
bias (80% high/20% low or 20% high/80% low) and item history
(target or distracter) as main factors revealed a reliably significant
effect of reward bias (F(1,15)=5.564, p,0.04, g
2
p=0.271), while
both the effect of item history and the interaction between the two
factors were far from significance (item history: F(1,15)=0.25, n.s.;
reward bias6item history: F(1,15)=0.08, n.s.) (Figure 2b, right
panel).
Therefore, unlike what we had found in the earlier study, here
the attentional bias determined by reward delivery emerged as a
main effect for all stimuli that overall had been more frequently
followed by high vs. low reward, regardless of the role (target or
distracter) played during training when differential rewards were
delivered. Stimuli more often associated with high rewards during
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more often associated with low rewards.
Given that the present experiment and Exp. 1 in [28] are
identical, except for the different instructions given to participants
about rewards, we carried out supplementary between-subjects
analyses in order to directly compare the results from the two
experiments. Two separate ANOVAs, one relative to target
effects and the other relative to distracter effects, were carried out
on data from the two experiments, with deception (present-
absent) as the between-subjects factor. In fact, while in the old
experiment subjects were deceived that rewards depended on
their performance, here rewards were told to be given on a
random basis (provided that the behavioral response was correct).
The other factors were reward bias (80% high/20% low or 20%
high/80% low) and item history (target or distracter), as in the
previous analyses.
Results from the between-subjects ANOVA relative to the
target effect revealed no significant main effect or interaction with
the between-subjects factor, reasserting that the reward related
manipulations applied during training do not emerge in the form
of target-selection biases in the current task (but see [28], Exp. 2).
The second ANOVA, relative to distracter effects, showed
instead an overall significant effect of reward bias (F(1,30)=5.969,
p,0.03, g
2
p=0.166), indicating a small but reliable global
disadvantage in responding on trials with a highly rewarded
distracter (749.7 ms, 80% high/20% low vs. 739.7 ms, 20% high/
80% low). The effect of item history was non significant, nor was
its interaction with the between-subject factor deception, while the
interaction between item history and reward bias was significant
both overall (F(1,30)=5.041, p,0.04, g
2
p=0.144) and in its
second order interaction with deception (F(1,30)=7.306, p,.02,
g
2
p=0.196). The latter, higher-order effect reveals that the
interaction between reward bias and item history was present
only in the deceived group (F(1,15)=17.868, p,0.001,
g
2
p=0.544; post-hoc t tests: T+ vs. T2, t(15)=3.715, p,0.002,
T+ vs. D+, t(15)=3.738, p,0.002; D2 vs. T2, t(15)=2.169,
p,0.05; D2 vs. D+, t(15)=2.281, p,0.04) (Figure 2a, right panel).
The striking difference between data in the right panels of Figure 2,
a and b, underscores the crucial influence of instructions given to
the participants in the present as opposed to our prior experiment.
Discussion
The present results extend considerably our knowledge on the
mechanisms underlying reward-related learning effects in visual
selective attention. The attentional processing of distracters, which
was crucial for task performance, proved to be particularly
sensitive to the delivery of biased rewards during training.
Following extensive training with biased reward delivery, dis-
tracter rejection showed robust adjustments that could still be
observed after a 5 days delay. Strikingly, such adjustments are not
insensitive to the informative value of reward signals. If, and only
if, performance is thought to be instrumental in leading to high or
low gains, then the adjustments will affect the specific attentional
computations engaged during execution of the reward-worthy
behavioral response [28]. Hence, for instance, inhibition will
become more efficient for stimuli that in the past have been
ignored with highly successful outcomes (i.e., D+ items), while it
will remain relatively poor for those that have been ignored the
same number of times, but with less favorable results (i.e., D2).
Inhibition is also impaired when dealing with items that have been
highly rewarded when selected as targets (i.e., T+) relatively to
items whose selection has more frequently led to lower gains (i.e.,
T2) [28]. Instead, when performance, and therefore the cognitive
operations underlying it, is thought to bear no causal relationships
with the following rewarding events, significant adjustments are
observed which do not keep track of the specific attentional
computations that were determinant for behavioral responses. In
this case attentional inhibition is only affected by the overall
frequency with which each stimulus had been followed by high or
low reward during training. As a consequence, all items (targets
and distracters) more frequently followed by high rewards (all ‘‘+’’
items) became more difficult to ignore during the test session.
Incidentally, it should be noted that given our 80-20 reward
imbalance, active only for stimuli shown in one attentional role
(target or distracter), and the 50-50 reward probability when the
same stimuli were shown in the alternative role, the overall effect
of reward bias reflects a rather small overall imbalance in reward
levels, namely 65-35. Should this imbalance be increased, most
likely the effects shown in Fig. 2b (right) would grow larger.
Looking at these results from the viewpoint of the more
traditional associative learning literature, the delivery of monetary
rewards seems to affect VSA in ways that are similar to those
available for the modification of overt behavior (e.g., [38–41]).
Thus, when performance is viewed as determinant in leading to
rewards, learning modulates the specific attentional processes that
enabled it (i.e., target selection and distracter inhibition) and a
form of instrumental attentional learning is observed (i.e., [42]). In
contrast, when rewards are non related to performance, as in the
present study, then stimuli become associated with the rewards
that have been coupled with them, regardless of the attentional
operations underlying response selection – within Pavlovian
associative learning (e.g., [43]), a phenomenon similar to
evaluative conditioning (e.g., [44,45]).
In general, human associative learning can be strongly
influenced by both the instructions delivered to participants [46–
48], and the participants’ beliefs on the contingencies between
performance and outcome [48,49]. These beliefs may also affect
the degree to which the learning-related modifications may
generalize and involve different levels of stimulus representations
(for a discussion see [50], pp. 204–207). Interestingly, Dickinson
et al. [49] demonstrated that when participants are initially
exposed to an experimental context in which outcomes are
determined by external causes, they fail to acquire instrumental
learning when outcomes are later rendered contingent on their
own performance. We might speculate that in our present study
the explicit instruction that rewards were delivered randomly
similarly blocked (i.e., [51,52]) instrumental learning for the
behaviorally relevant contingencies.
According to the notion of Pavlovian-to-instrumental transfer
(e.g., [53]), instrumental learning emerges following two consec-
utive phases: initially, a perceptual stimulus is associated with a
contiguous reward in a Pavlovian fashion. Subsequently, subjects
learn to act in response to this stimulus in order to evoke the
associated reward. If this were also the case for the attentional
learning that we have induced, then we might conjecture that
when rewards are viewed as unrelated to performance only the
first – automatic – association is formed, and only the overall
contingencies between stimulus representations and rewards will
be learned. If instead rewards are thought to depend on
performance, then the process develops completely and learning
modulates not just a generic stimulus representation, but
specifically the attentional weighing (or prioritization) process
acting on this representation (i.e., selected as a target or inhibited
as a distracter).
Taken altogether, these findings reveal that rewards can
determine long-term changes in visual selective attention by
means of at least two distinct mechanisms. One such mechanism is
Distinct Effects of Reward on Attentional Learning
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comes into play when rewards signify feedback on behavioral
efficiency. The other mechanism instead detects the co-occurrence
between processing of certain objects in the environment (whether
attended or ignored) and the rewarding value of the events that
accompany them, and reflects the establishment of direct, passive
associations between the two.
Both types of learning effect may be accompanied by lasting
changes in the neural representation of reward-associated stimuli
in visual cortex [26,35,36,54]. In addition, areas involved in
attentional processing and control [55] and several nodes of the
reward processing system [56,57], including the striatum (e.g.,
[54]), the orbitofrontal cortex (e.g., [54]), and sectors of the
anterior cingulate cortex (e.g., [30]), might similarly participate in
both our learning protocols. Furthermore, recent evidence
suggests that specific subcortical structures, such as portions of
the striatum [58–60], might be crucially recruited only when
rewards are perceived to depend on performance, giving rise to
action-dependent instrumental learning. It would then be
particularly interesting to explore whether training with such
different types of attentional learning protocols recruits specific
and dissociable patterns of brain activity, both at the cortical and
subcortical level, highlighting the contribution of specific brain
structures to distinct forms of reward-mediated attentional
learning.
Author Contributions
Conceived and designed the experiments: CDL LC. Performed the
experiments: CDL AP. Analyzed the data: CDL AP. Wrote the paper:
CDL AP LC.
References
1. Duncan J (2006) EPS Mid-Career Award 2004: Brain mechanisms of attention.
Q J Exp Psychol 59: 2–27. doi:10.1080/17470210500260674.
2. Egeth HE, Yantis S (1997) Visual attention: Control, representation, and time
course. Annu Rev Psychol 48: 269–297. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.48.1.269.
3. Pashler HE (1999) The Psychology of Attention. Cambridge: MIT Press. 510 p.
4. Reynolds JH, Chelazzi L (2004) Attentional modulation of visual processing.
Annu Rev Neurosci 27: 611–647. doi:10.1146/annurev.neuro.26.041002.
131039.
5. Chun MM, Turk-Browne NB (2007) Interactions between attention and
memory. Curr Opin Neurobiol 17: 177–184. doi:10.1016/j.conb.2007.03.005.
6. Chun MM, Golomb JD, Turk-Browne NB (2011) A taxonomy of external and
internal attention. Annu Rev Psychol 62: 73–101. doi:10.1146/annurev.
psych.093008.100427.
7. Desimone R (1996) Neural mechanisms for visual memory and their role in
attention. Proc Natl Acad Sci U S A 93: 13494–13499.
8. Kristja `nsson A, Campana G (2010) Where perception meets memory: A review
of repetition priming in visual search tasks. Atten Percept Psychophys 72: 5–18.
doi: 10.3758/APP.72.1.5.
9. Logan GD (2002) An instance theory of attention and memory. Psychol Rev
109: 376–400. doi:10.1037//0033-295X.109.2.376.
10. Chun MM (2000) Contextual cueing of visual attention. Trends Cogn Sci 4:
170–177. doi:10.1016/S1364-6613(00)01476-5.
11. Chun MM, Jiang Y (1998) Contextual cueing: implicit learning and memory of
visual context guides spatial attention. Cogn Psychol 36: 28–71. doi:10.1006/
cogp.1998.0681.
12. Chun MM, Jiang Y (1999) Top-down attentional guidance based on implicit
learning of visual covariation. Psychol Sci 10: 360–365. doi:10.1111/1467-
9280.00168.
13. Ciaramitaro VM, Cameron EL, Glimcher PW (2001) Stimulus probability
directs spatial attention: an enhancement of sensitivity in humans and monkeys.
Vision Res 41: 57–75. doi:10.1016/S0042-6989(00)00203-0.
14. Dixon ML, Ruppel J, Pratt J, De Rosa E (2009) Learning to ignore: Acquisition
of sustained attentional suppression. Psychon Bull Rev 16: 418–423.
doi:10.3758/PBR.16.2.418.
15. Geng JJ, Behrmann M (2002) Probability cuing of target location facilitates
visual search implicitly in normal participants and patients with hemispatial
neglect. Psychol Sci 13: 520–525. doi:10.1111/1467-9280.00491.
16. Hoffman J, Kunde W (1999) Location-specific target expectancies in visual
search. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 25: 1127–1141.
17. Jiang Y, Chun MM (2001) Selective attention modulates implicit learning.
Q J Exp Psychol A 54: 1105–1124. doi:10.1080/02724980042000516.
18. Kelley TA, Yantis S (2009) Learning to attend: Effects of practice on information
selection. J Vis 9: 1–18. doi:10.1167/9.7.16.
19. Kelley TA, Yantis S (2010) Neural correlates of learning to attend. Front Hum
Neurosci 4: 216. doi:10.3389/fnhum.2010.00216.
20. Kyllingsbæk S, Schneider WX, Bundesen C (2001) Automatic attraction of
attention to former targets in visual displays of letters. Percept Psychophys 63:
85–98.
21. Miller J (1988) Components of the location probability effect in visual search
tasks. J Exp Psychol Hum Percept Perform 14: 453–471.
22. Shiffrin RM, Schneider WX (1977) Controlled and automatic human
information processing: II. Perceptual learning, automatic attending, and a
general theory. Psychol Rev 84: 127–190.
23. Tang Y-Y, Posner MI (2009) Attention training and attention state training.
Trends Cogn Sci 13: 222–227. doi:10.1016/j.tics.2009.01.009.
24. Tseng C-H, Gobell JL, Sperling G (2004) Long-lasting sensitization to a given
colour after visual search. Nature 428: 657–660. doi:10.1038/nature02443.
25. Vidnya `nszky Z, Sohn W (2005) Learning to suppress task-irrelevant visual
stimuli with attention. Vision Res 45: 677–685. doi:10.1016/j.visres.2004.10.
009.
26. Jagadeesh B, Chelazzi L, Mishkin M, Desimone R (2001) Learning increases
stimulus salience in anterior inferior temporal cortex of the macaque.
J Neurophysiol 86: 290–303.
27. Della Libera C, Chelazzi L (2006) Visual selective attention and the effects of
monetary rewards. Psychol Sci 17: 222–227. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2006.
01689.x.
28. Della Libera C, Chelazzi L (2009) Learning to attend and to ignore is a matter of
gains and losses. Psychol Sci 20: 778–784. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.
02360.x.
29. Hickey C, Chelazzi L, Theeuwes J (2010) Reward primes target selection in
visual search but not suppression of distractors. Vis Cogn. In press. doi:10.1080/
13506285.2010.503946.
30. Hickey C, Chelazzi L, Theeuwes J (2010) Reward changes salience in human
vision via the anterior cingulate. J Neurosci 30: 11096–11103. doi:10.1523/
JNEUROSCI.1026-10.2010.
31. Hickey C, Chelazzi L, Theeuwes J (2010) Reward guides vision when it’s your
thing: Trait reward-seeking in reward-mediated visual priming. PLoS One 5:
e14087. doi:10.1371/journal.pone.0014087.
32. Kiss M, Driver J, Eimer M (2009) Reward priority of visual target singletons
modulates event-related potential signatures of attentional selection. Psychol Sci
20: 245–251. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02281.x.
33. Kristja `nsson A, Sigurjo `nsdo `ttir O, Driver J (2010) Fortune and reversals of
fortune in visual search: Reward contingencies for pop-out targets affect search
efficiency and target repetition effects. Atten Percept Psychophys 72: 1229–1236.
doi:10.3758/APP.72.5.1229.
34. Raymond JE, O’Brien JL (2009) Selective visual attention and motivation: the
consequences of value learning in an attentional blink task. Psychol Sci 20:
981–988. doi:10.1111/j.1467-9280.2009.02391.x.
35. Pessiglione M, Petrovic P, Daunizeau J, Palminteri S, Dolan RJ, et al. (2008)
Subliminal instrumental conditioning demonstrated in the human brain. Neuron
59: 561–567. doi:10.1016/j.neuron.2008.07.005.
36. Franko ´ E, Seitz AR, Vogels R (2010) Dissociable neural effects of long-term
stimulus-reward pairing in macaque visual cortex. J Cogn Neurosci 22:
1425–1439. doi:10.1162/jocn.2009.21288.
37. Seitz AR, Kim D, Watanabe T (2009) Rewards evoke learning of unconsciously
processed visual stimuli in adult humans. Neuron 61: 700–707. doi:10.1016/
j.neuron.2009.01.016.
38. Castro L, Wasserman EA (2010) Animal learning. Wiley Interdiscip Rev Cogn
Sci 1: 89–98. doi:10.1002/wcs.18.
39. Shanks DR (1993) Human instrumental learning: A critical review of data and
theory. Br J Psychol 84: 319–354.
40. Shanks DR (2007) Associationism and cognition: Human contingency learning
at 25. Q J Exp Psychol 60: 291–309. doi:10.1080/17470210601000581.
41. Shanks DR (2010) Learning: From association to cognition. Annu Rev Psychol
61: 273–301. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.093008.100519.
42. Dickinson A (1994) Instrumental conditioning. In: Mackintosh NJ, ed. Animal
learning and cognition. San Diego: Academic Press. pp 45–80.
43. Hall G (1994) Pavlovian conditioning. Laws of association. In: Mackintosh NJ,
ed. Animal learning and cognition. San Diego: Academic Press. pp 15–44.
44. De Houwer J, Baeyens F, Field AP (2005) Associative learning of likes and
dislikes: Some current controversies and possible ways forward. Cogn Emot 19:
162–174. doi:10.1080/02699930441000265.
45. De Houwer J, Thomas S, Baeyens F (2001) Associative learning of likes and
dislikes: A review of 25 years of research on human evaluative conditioning.
Psychol Bull 127: 853–869. doi:10.1037//0033-2909.127.6.853.
46. Baron A, Kaufman A, Stauber KA (1969) Effects of instructions and
reinforcement-feedback on human operant behavior maintained by fixed-
interval reinforcement. J Exp Anal Behav 12: 701–712. doi:10.1901/
jeab.1969.12-701.
Distinct Effects of Reward on Attentional Learning
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 5 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e1946047. Hayes SC, Brownstein AJ, Haas JR, Greenway DE (1986) Instructions, multiple
schedules, and extinction: Distinguishing rule-governed from schedule-con-
trolled behavior. J Exp Anal Behav 46: 137–147. doi:10.1901/jeab.1986.46-137.
48. Rosenfarb IS, Newland MC, Brannon SE, Howey DS (1992) Effects of self-
generated rules on the development of schedule-controlled behavior. J Exp Anal
Behav 58: 107–121. doi:10.1901/jeab.1992.58-107.
49. Dickinson A, Shanks DR, Evenden JL (1984) Judgment of act-outcome
contingency: The role of selective attribution. Q J Exp Psychol A 36: 29–50.
doi:10.1080/14640748408401502.
50. Baddeley AD (1990) Human Memory: theory and practice. Hove: Lawrence
Erlbaum Associates Ltd. Publishers. 423 p.
51. Kamin LJ (1969) Selective association and conditioning. In Mackintosh NJ,
Honig WK, eds. Fundamental Issues in Instrumental Learning. Halifax:
Dalhousie University Press. pp 42–64.
52. Kruschke JK, Blair NJ (2000) Blocking and backward blocking involve learned
inattention. Psychon Bull Rev 7: 636–645.
53. Lovibond PF (1983) Facilitation of instrumental behavior by a pavlovian
appetitive conditioned stimuls. J Exp Psychol Anim Behav Process 9: 225–247.
54. Weil RS, Furl N, Ruff CC, Symmonds M, Flandin G, et al. (2010) Rewarding
feedback after correct visual discriminations has both general and specific
influences on visual cortex. J Neurophysiol 104: 1746–1757. doi:10.1152/
jn.00870.2009.
55. Peck CJ, Jangraw DC, Suzuki M, Efem R, Gottlieb J (2009) Reward modulates
attention independently of action value in posterior parietal cortex. J Neurosci
29: 11182–11191. doi:10.1523/JNEUROSCI.1929-09.2009.
56. O’Doherty JP (2004) Reward representations and reward-related learning in the
human brain: insights from neuroimaging. Curr Opin Neurobiol 14: 769–776.
doi:10.1016/j.conb.2004.10.016.
57. Schultz W (2006) Behavioral theories and the neurophysiology of reward. Annu
Rev Psychol 57: 87–115. doi:10.1146/annurev.psych.56.091103.070229.
58. Tricomi EM, Delgado MR, Fiez JA (2004) Modulation of caudate activity by
action contingency. Neuron 41: 281–292. doi:10.1016/S0896-6273(03)00848-1.
59. Bjork JM, Hommer DW (2007) Anticipating instrumentally obtained and
passively-received rewards: A factorial fMRI investigation. Behav Brain Res 177:
165–170. doi:10.1016/j.bbr.2006.10.034.
60. Hakyemez HS, Dagher A, Smith SD, Zald DH (2008) Striatal dopamine
transmission in healthy humans during a passive monetary reward task.
Neuroimage 39: 2058–2065. doi:10.1016/j.neuroimage.2007.10.034.
Distinct Effects of Reward on Attentional Learning
PLoS ONE | www.plosone.org 6 April 2011 | Volume 6 | Issue 4 | e19460